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Judicial Nullification
MICHAEL J. SAKS*
You are the law. Not some book. Not the lawyers. Not a marble statute or
the trappings of the court. Those are just the symbols of our desire to be
just .... If we are to have faith in justice, we need only to believe in
ourselves and act with justice. I believe there is justice in our hearts.
-From Paul Newman's closing argument in The Verdict'
INTRODUCTION
In his opening remarks to the conference that gave rise to the papers in this
issue, Newton Minow struck a chord that resonated with unusual strength and
clarity across many of the succeeding speakers.2 Mr. Minow observed that his
wife and one of his daughters-two educated persons who lived many years
in a legally literate home-recently had served as jurors and both had found
the judges' instructions on the law to be incomprehensible. How could they
apply the law if in effect they never were told what the law was? Subsequent
speakers confirmed this observation both anecdotally and with reference to
systematic empirical research on the question.
The thesis of this Article is that by effectively and persistently offering
juries instructions that cannot be understood, judges regularly nullify the law.
Judges have done so for centuries, and they are unlikely to stop. And perhaps
they ought not to stop.
This Article will proceed in three steps. The first part briefly reviews some
of the research findings concerning the communication of law to jurors
through customary instruction by judges. The basic finding is that jurors
generally are no more informed about the law with instruction from the bench
than they are without such instruction. The second part discusses the import
of those findings. In essence, the failure to instruct jurors nullifies the law and
leaves jurors free to decide cases using their own intuitions about justice.
Although reforms to improve communication from judge to jury are entirely
feasible, such change rarely comes from judicial initiative, though it has come
from other legal quarters. The third part considers possible explanations for
the widespread practice of judicial nullification. Some of these explanations
suggest that the practice serves useful functions that need to be preserved.
* Professor of Law and Faculty Scholar, University of Iowa. Ph.D., 1975, The Ohio State
University; M.S.L., 1983, Yale Law School. My thanks go to the Boston College law faculty, who
offered many helpfil and challenging suggestions during a talk I gave on this topic. My thanks also go
to Howard Larsen for his valuable research assistance.
1. THE VERDICT (Twentieth Century-Fox 1982).
2. Communicating with Juries, Welcoming Remarks and Statement of the Issues, The Annenberg
Washington Program Conference, April 10, 1992, 68 IND. LJ. 1033, 1034 (statement of of Mr. Minow).
1281
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
I. NULLIFICATION BY NON-INSTRUCTION
The basic notion of instructing,juries on the law applicable to the case
before them makes obvious sense. After seeing what evidence has been
offered in a case and what legal issues have emerged, with the guidance of
various sources of substantive law, the trial judge and attorneys, in adversarial
collaboration, can fashion a correct statement of the law bearing on the case
to present to the jury. Indeed, if we are to have a lay jury for all of the
institutional' and societal benefits4 it provides, then how other than educating
them in the relevant law can we bring the law to bear on their decisions?
But that basic sound idea is accomplished with difficulty, if at all.
Instructions often are lengthy and complex, because the issues in a case may
be numerous, subtle, and complicated. Many legal concepts are obscure. And
nearly all are rendered in language whose structure is confusing and whose
words are abstruse.
In the first-year criminal law class I teach, if students seem especially
perplexed by a legal concept, I sometimes provide them with a state's
standard jury instruction on the point. "What could be more illuminating than
to hear how the concept is explained to the lay people who are actually going
to apply it in deciding a case?," I preface. Gross negligence. Recklessness.
Premeditation. Causation. More often than not, the students find the
instructions stunningly unhelpful. How, then, does a jury find them?5 Jerome
3. For example, the division of responsibility between judge (as decider of what evidence may
come in or be kept out) and jury (as decider of the case on the basis of evidence that the judge finds
fit to admit) permits a degree of evidence management that would not otherwise be possible. Other
institutional benefits are discussed by HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
(1966) and VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986).
4. For example, the jury serves as a lightning rod for public discontent with any particular trial
verdict, thus insulating the judiciary from individual and accumulated dissatisfaction. Other social
functions are discussed in HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 3; KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3; and
Michael J. Saks, Blaming the Jury, 75 GEO. L.J. 693 (1986).
5. When the legal concepts are themselves confused, no amount of effort at clarification of
language is going to help matters. For example, concerning the distinction between first- and second-
degree murder, Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael had this to say: "The trial judge must solemnly
distinguish in his charge between the two degrees in terms which frequently render them quite
indistinguishable, a procedure which obviously confers on the jury a discretion to follow one aspect of
the charge or the other, if not a valid excuse for neglecting the charge entirely." Herbert Wechsler &
Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide I, 37 COLum. L. REV. 701, 709 (1937). Justice
Cardozo concurred: "The... distinction is so obscure that no jury hearing it for the first time can fairly
be expected to assimilate and understand it. I am not at all sure that I understand it myself after trying
to apply it for many years and after diligent study of what has been written in the books." BENJAMIN
CARDozo, Law and Literature, in LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES (1931).
Problems of this sort are of a much different order than merely taking sensible concepts and fuzzing
them up when telling jurors about them. Where the concepts themselves are unsound, judges employ
a "mystifying cloud of words," to use Cardozo's phrase, to hide the absence of a workable legal
distinction.
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Frank offered an answer in a case decided more than forty years ago:
[O]ften the judge must state [the law] to the jury with such niceties that
many lawyers do not comprehend them,. and it is impossible that the jury
can. Judge Bok notes that "juries have the disadvantage of being treated
like children while the testimony is going on, but then being doused with
a kettleful of law during the charge that would make a third-year law
student blanch."6
The comprehensibility of jury instructions has been tested empirically in a
number of ways. Charrow and Charrowj a linguist and a lawyer, took a
number of California jury instructions and rewrote them using principles for
enhancing comprehension that had been developed by linguists and psycho-
linguists. Testing the standard versus the revised versions of these instruc-
tions, they confirmed that the revised versions imparted far more understand-
ing.
Elwork, Sales, and Alfini8 carried out similar work on Michigan's
instructions. Their comparative tests of the instructions were conducted in a
more trial-like context. These researchers presented jurors with a videotaped
civil trial, followed either by the standard or the revised instructions, or by
no instruction at all. The researchers studied the jurors' abilities to evaluate
the evidence and to reach what would be considered a legally correct verdict.
Jurors provided with improved instructions did considerably better than jurors
in the other two conditions. In fact, jurors receiving the standard instructions
did no better than jurors receiving no instruction at all.
Severance and Loftus9 extended this genre of research to criminal trials. In
addition, they had their revised instructions reviewed by panels of lawyers to
evaluate whether the revised versions seemed vulnerable to reversal on appeal.
Satisfied that the revisions would withstand legal scrutiny, they replicated the
previous research with essentially the same results.
All told, there is broad agreement that judges do not actually instruct jurors
in the law-if by instructing we mean communicating the law to the jurors
and not merely performing a ritual where bewildering words are uttered in a
jury's presence. Put differently, judges routinely nullify the law by rendering
it meaningless, thereby compelling jurors to invent the law themselves.
6. Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1948) (citation omitted).
7. Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 CoLUM. L. REv. 1306 (1979).
8. AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INsTRucrIoNs UNDERSTANDABLE (1982).
9. Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend
and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc'y REv. 153 (1982).
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I. IMPLICATIONS
If we place the judicial attitude toward jury nullification alongside the rule
vacuums created by judges and filled by juries, we confront an exquisite
puzzle. On the surface, it would appear that these are two threads that cannot
be twined together. Although the law recognizes the power of juries to judge
the law as well as the facts, and thereby to nullify the law, judicial decisions
have sought to restrain that power with a very short leash.
In colonial times, the jury's power to return a verdict "in the teeth of both
law and facts,"'0 as Oliver Wendell Holmes once put it, was valued as a
means of protecting citizens from unjust laws of the crown. Andrew Hamilton
argued that where the law grants the power to do something, it unavoidably
conveys as well the right to exercise that power." In the celebrated trial of
John Peter Zenger in 1735, Hamilton argued that truth should be a defense to
libel, even though English law provided no such defense, and that jurors "are
by law at liberty ... to find both the law and the fact .... '"' Zenger's jury
returned a general verdict of not guilty, establishing the power of juries to
nullify law and winning the praise of revolutionary leaders. Although the
Zenger trial was on a charge of criminal libel, the case eventually led to "a
widespread popular conviction at the time of the adoption of the Seventh
Amendment that a jury in a civil case [also had] the right to 'decide the
law.""' 13 The colonial view has been summarized as being
that jurors had a duty to find a verdict according to their own conscience,
though in opposition to the direction of the court; that their power signified
a right; that they were judges both of law and of fact in a criminal case,
and not bound by the opinion of the court. 4
10. Homing v. District of Columbia, 245 U.S. 135, 138 (1920) (Holmes, J.) (dictum).
11. For discussions of the history of the evolution ofjury nullification law in the United States, see
United States v. Krzyske, 857 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113,
1130-43 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D.
Pa. 1979); MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DIscRETION TO DISOBEY (1973); Mark
DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939); Alan Scheflin & Jon
Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1980).
12. JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER
(Stanley Katz ed., 1963).
13. Zenith, 478 F. Supp. at 940 n.90 (citation omitted).
14. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1132 (citing Howe, supra note 11). Commenting on this power of the
jury in his diary in 1771, John Adams wrote:
Now, should the melancholy case arise that the judges should give their opinions to the
jury against one of these fundamental principles, is a juror obliged to find his verdict
generally, according to this direction or even to find the fact specially and submit the law
to the court? Every man of any feeling or conscience, will answer no. It is not only his
1284 [Vol. 68:1281
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This power remains part of the warp and woof of procedures that permit juries
secret and unreviewable deliberations and that typically ask them to render
only general verdicts.
Post-revolutionary American government inevitably revised its view of itself
from rebel to ruler, and with that change came a less enthusiastic view of the
power of juries to rewrite the government's laws. The first critical decision
came in the 1835 case of United States v. Battiste,15 where Justice Story
announced the notion that the jury's function lay in accepting the law given
to it by the court and applying that law to the facts. This opinion took on
increasing influence, culminating in Sparf and Hansen v. United States6 in
1895. Sparf established what remains the modern view of jury nullification,
holding that
it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and
apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence. Upon
the court rests the responsibility of declaring the law; upon the jury, the
responsibility of applying the law so declared to the facts as they, upon
their conscience, believe them to be.'7
Thus, contrary to Hamilton's view, current law holds that while juries have
the power to nullify, they have no corresponding right to exercise that
power.' 8 "[J]ury nullification is just a power, not also a right."' 9 And
certainly there is no right of a litigant to demand an instruction apprising
jurors of their power to nullify.2 °
right, but his duty, in that case to find the verdict according to his own best understand-
ing, judgment, and conscience, though in direct opposition to the directions of the court.
LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMs 253-55 (C.F. Adams ed., 1856).
15. 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545).
16. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
17. Id. at 102.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Anderson, 716
F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1983); Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113.
In the division of responsibilities between judge and jury, the jurors have no prerogative
to question in the slightest degree the law to be applied to an issue, as announced by the
court in its instructions. Indeed, the jurors each swear to render a "true verdict"
"according to the evidence and the law as given you by the Court.'
United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d 943, 946 (3d Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted).
19. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932.
20. Maryland is the sole exception. Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland
Constitution provides: "In the trial of all criminal cases, the jury shall be the Judges of the Law, as well
as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction."
MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 23.
For an especially interesting case on instructing jurors concerning their powers, see United States v.
Krzyske, 857 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir. 1988), where jurors specifically asked the trial judge to explain
nullification to them. This trial judge was put in the especially awkward position of having to conceal
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Modem courts have grown comfortable with these strained notions.
Consider the following illustrative judicial statements:
The existence of an unreviewable and unreversible power in the jury,
to acquit in disregard of the instructions on the law given by the trial
judge, has for many years co-existed with legal practice and precedent
upholding instructions to the jury that they are required to follow the
instructions of the court on all matters of law.
2
'
Although jurors may indeed have the power to ignore the law, their duty
is to apply the law as interpreted by the court and they should be so'
instructed.22
There is remarkable irony in all this. The insistence that juries must "take
the law as the judge gives it to them" presupposes that judges are giving
juries some law. But, as we have seen, to a great extent, judges would be
giving as much by saying nothing. This irony becomes all the more puzzling
if we focus on the reasoning behind judges' ardent hostility to jury nullifica-
tion:
I just don't see how we can claim to have a government under the law
and then tell jurors they can define the law. It would be chaotic and
completely inconsistent with the fundamental principles underlying our
system. It would be a kind of dictatorship of the proletariat.23
from the jury its powers even in response to a direct question from the jurors. The trial judge's decision
to be less than candid in answer to the jury's question was upheld on appeal.
Alternatively, a complete and honest statement on the subject to a contemporary jury might be
accomplished by replacing the word "right" with "power" in the following jury charge, which was given
in 1794:
It may not be amiss, here, gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule, that on
questions of fact, it is the province of the jury; on questions of law, it is the province of
the court to decide. But it must be observed, that by the same law, which recognizes this
reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon
yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.
On this, and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt, you will pay that
respect which is due to the opinion of the court: For, as on the one hand, it is presumed,
that juries are the best judges of facts; it is on the other hand, presumable, that the courts
are the best judges of law.
Chief Justice John Jay's charge to the jury in Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 1, 4 (1794).
21. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1132.
22. Krzyske, 836 F.2d at 1021 (quoting United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1027 (6th Cir.
1988)).
23. Katherine Bishop, Diverse Group Wants Juries to Follow Natural Law, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 27,
1991, at B16 (quoting Judge William Schwarzer, former federal district judge, now director of the
Federal Judicial Center) (responding to a reporter's questions about the efforts of "The Fully Informed
Jury Association [FIJA]... formed two years ago to lobby for laws and state constitutional amendments
that would force judges to inform juries of their 'inherent right' to judge not only the facts of a case,
but also whether the law itself is unjust or misapplied").
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We recognize and tolerate this as a worthwhile anomaly in the rule of law.
But if this occasional departure from the general application of the law
were to be institutionalized-if it were to become the rule rather than the
tolerated departure from the rule, we would have a kind of anarchy; that
is, a system in which the ultimate test of socially permissible conduct is,
to a significant degree, the random reaction of a group of twelve people
selected at random. Acceptance of this as the principle governing individual
conduct which collides with the rules adopted by governmental processes
would, of course, amount to rejection of law as the controlling principle of
society.24
[This] proposal would create a law-less society, not a lawless society, but
a law-less society, a society without law, without regulations. That is a
monstrosity. No such society has ever existed or ever will exist.25
Public and private safety alike would be in peril, if the principle be
established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as
expounded to them by the court and become a law unto themselves. Under
such a system, the principal function of the judge would be to preside and
keep order while jurymen, untrained in the law, would determine questions
affecting life, liberty, or property according to such legal principles as, in
their judgement, were applicable to the particular case being tried.26
Persistent reliance on incomprehensible jury instructions creates the very
anarchy that these judges insist they abhor.27 If judges really are concerned
that jurors follow the law, they not only would tell them they must follow the
law, they would communicate the law to the jurors in a way that offered some
hope that jurors would understand and therefore follow it. Upon learning that
their instructions effectively nullify the law, judges might set to work-with
a horror equal to the thought of instructing a jury on its power to nulli-
fy-developing instructions that actually instruct. But judges do not. Indeed,
as we soon shall see, they have generally moved in precisely the opposite
direction.
24. United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 n.12 (9th Cir. 1972) (quoting Justice Abe Fortas,
comment from panel discussion, Follow-Up/The Jury, CENTER MAG., July-Aug. 1970, at 59, 61).
25. Simpson, 460 F.2d at 520 (quoting Judge Simon Rifkind, comment from panel discussion,
Follow-Up/The Jury, CENTER MAG., July-Aug. 1970, at 59, 66).
26. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101 (1895).
27. At the same time, it also means that the world the FIJA seeks already exists. But neither the
judiciary nor the FIJA seem to have noticed. Yet, since this has produced neither the chaos feared by
the judges nor the widespread nullification sought by the FIJA, we might wonder why. The answer, I
suspect, is that citizens' intuitions about justice closely parallel those of legislators and judges, especially
in the context of concrete cases. When jurors do nullify, we can infer that judges usually agree with
them-indeed, probably approve of their departures-because judges rarely exercise their power to set
aside jury verdicts.
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Judges are not entirely indifferent to the incomprehensibility of their
instructions. In a recent example, the California Supreme Court in Mitchell v.
Gonzales28 invalidated that state's so-called proximate cause instruction29
on thie ground that it led to excessive confusion of jurors. The court made this
finding citing Charrow and Charrow's research.3" In an even more recent
case, a federal court invalidated a state-imposed death sentence upon learning
that as many as three-quarters of jury-eligible persons could not understand
the trial court's "guidance" concerning when to impose death.3'
But such invalidations of instructions are the exceptions that prove the rule.
Despite research demonstrating the problems of instructions and ways to
improve them, few invalidations occur.32 Indeed, a systematic look at law
reform efforts to improve jury instructions conducted by Professor J.
Alexander Tanford showed that judicial invalidation of jury instructions
occurred even less frequently after the publication of research demonstrating
the need for reform.33 Tanford compared decisions made both before and
after the dissemination of such research. He focused on two specific reforms
that had been tested and found to be effective, in enabling jurors to better
understand the law: giving preliminary instructions (as well as instructing
jurors at the end of trial) and providing a written copy of the instructions for
jurors to take with them into their deliberations.
28. 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991).
29. "So-called" because, as the court itself notes, "despite the use of the terms proximate cause and
legal cause, BAR Nos. 3.75 and 3.76 are instructions on cause-in-fact. Issues that are properly referred
to as questions of proximate or legal cause are contained in other instructions." Mitchell, 819 P.2d at
873.
30. The California Supreme Court found:
The misunderstanding engendered by the term "proximate cause" has been
documented. In a scholarly study of 14 jury instructions, BAJI No. 3.75 [the instruction
at issue] produced proportionally the most misunderstanding among lay-persons. The
study noted two significant problems with BAi No. 3.75. First, because the phrase
"natural and continuous sequence" precedes "the verb it is intended to modify, the
construction leaves the listener with the impression that the cause itself is in a natural and
continuous sequence. Inasmuch as a single 'cause' cannot be in a continuous sequence,
the listener is befuddled." Second, in one experiment, "the term 'proximate cause' was
misunderstood by 23% of the subjects .... They interpreted it as 'approximate cause,'
'estimated cause,' or some fabrication."
Mitchell, 54 Cal. 3d at 1051 (footnote and citations omitted) (citing Charrow & Charrow, supra note
7).
31. Helene Cooper, Child-Divorce Case Marks Legal Evolution, WALL ST. J. Sept. 28, 1992, at B6
(reporting on United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 778 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. I11. 1991).
32. The Gonzales case, for example, was decided twelve years after publication of the research. We
can only wonder how many times California's "proximate cause" instruction was given to juries in the
intervening years.
33. J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform By Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions Following
Empirical Research on Jury Instructions, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 155 (1991).
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Tanford found such before-and-after decisions had been made by appellate
courts in 17 jurisdictions, by legislatures in 25 jurisdictions, and by rule-
making commissions in 29 jurisdictions. His conclusion:
Courts have not only ignored the new data but actually have moved the law
in the directidn opposite to the suggestions of the social scientists.
Legislatures generally have done nothing or moved slightly toward the
suggested reforms. Commissions have made the most substantial changes,
engaging in extensive reform of jury instruction procedures along the lines
suggested by the research.34
Interestingly, then, judges have been the least eager to see that juries receive
instructions that are sufficiently informative so that jurors can in fact "follow
the law as it is given to them by the judge."
Thus, the question confronting us is why judges insist on the power to
interpret the law to jurors, on the obligation of jurors to follow the law, on
the right of judges to conceal from jurors their power to nullify the law, but
then keep the law a virtual secret from jurors so that they must decide cases
on their own intuitions and equities? That is, why do judges nullify the law?
III. EXPLANATIONS
Why do judges nullify the law? For the present discussion, I reject out of
hand the facile answer that judges are ignorant, backward, obsessed with
avoiding reversal at any cost, or chronically slow to change. I assume the
judiciary is as capable as any other branch of government in learning about
a problem, the research on it, and the tested improvements. Moreover,
Tanford's research shows that in spite of their explicit awareness, judges often
choose not to adopt the indicated reforms or to move in a direction exactly
contrary.
This leads me to suspect that the explanation for judicial nullification lies
in its institutional importance, which encompasses several underlying
functions. These functions may not be evident to the judges themselves,
whose choices may be driven by forces of which they are not entirely aware,
but which are nonetheless real. I want to explore several possible institutional
functions of judicial nullification, all of which lead, to a greater or lesser
extent, to the conclusion that judicial nullification of the law in jury trials is
an important feature of the trial system that perhaps should be preserved,
rather than reformed. At the least, radical clarification of instructions probably
34. Id. at 157 (emphasis in original).
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should not be undertaken without careful thought about the wider institutional
effects of doing so.
A. Judicial Control
One possibility is that judicial nullification may be a tool that gives judges
increased control over the outcomes of individual cases. The practice of
giving jurors meaningless instructions need not be uniform across cases.
Judges may vary the instructions, or their amplification upon them, so that in
certain kinds of cases they may choose to be more, and in others less, clear
and thereby bring the law more or less fully to bear. In that way, judges exert
more, not less, influence over the verdict.
Where the judge believes that the desired outcome of the case would be
impeded by the law, the judge can nullify the law and allow the jury to use
its equities to reach the result the judge desires. On the other hand, when the
judge believes the law would lead the jurors to the correct conclusion in a
case, the court has a variety of means at its disposal, each varying in its
subtlety. Making the law more accessible to the jury is but one of the more
subtle of these tools. A less subtle device, for example, would be to use a
special verdict, reserving the application of law to itself. The least subtle
device would be to enter a judgement notwithstanding the verdict.
In addition, incomprehensible instructions provide a better medium on
which a judge may communicate nonverbally his or her views of how a case
should be decided. While English judges may comment on the evidence, in
most American jurisdictions, judges may not do so. American judges have a
more subtle implement: nonverbal behavior. It has been found that judges'
nonverbal behavior varies with the judge's views of a case, and juries detect
these nonverbal cues and tend to decide cases in line with them. 5 The
clearer the evidence, and the clearer the law, the less influence the judge's
nonverbal signals will have. The judge can control the ambiguity of the law
through the process of instruction. Moreover, the judge's nonverbal messages
can be effectively sent during the giving of instructions.
The point is not that judges are trying to nullify the law in any diabolical
way. The law's influence is mediated through the judge, and judges may
recognize cases where following the letter of the law would lead to results
contrary to the law's true intent. In such instances, judicial nullification is
35. See Peter D. Blanck et al., Note, The Appearance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal
Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REv. 89 (1985); Allen Hart, Expectancies in the
Courtroom: Judicial NonverbalBehavior and Influence, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming
1993).
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useful, because telling the jury explicitly about its nullification power would
undercut some or much of the judge's control. Empirical research on the
effects of explicit nullification instruction reveals that whether telling the jury
of its power to nullify influences the jury's verdict depends on the extent of
the instruction and the type of case.36
Leaving the jury entirely to its own equities would never enhance the
judge's control. This is because there are three basic choices of "law" for the
jury to follow. One is what the law is. Second is what the jury thinks the law
is. Third is what the jury thinks the law of the case should be. Clear
instruction on the law leads juries to the first. Judicial nullification leads
juries to the second. And jury nullification leads to the third. Thus, juries are
still under substantial judicial control only when they are not given radically
explicit nullification instructions.3"
B. Reinforcement of the Adversary System
An alternative explanation of the practice of judicial nullification is that it
enhances the power of the parties to try their own cases. It may be that
judges, who are supposed to give instructions on the law, effectively do not
instruct. At the same time, it may be that lawyers, who are not supposed to
give legal instructions, do instruct. In their closing arguments, and to some
degree in their opening statements, most or many lawyers tell jurors the law
on which the judge is expected to instruct them. Moreover, informal
instruction by lawyers as a part of their arguments is likely to be offered with
greater clarity as well as with an adversarial purpose.
If this is what happens, it may be that jurors in actual trials are better
informed than the research has thus far managed to detect.38 Moreover,
permitting jurors to learn of the law this way allows parties, through their
36. Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions, Arguments, and
Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1988). Horowitz gave experimental
juries three types of instructions: Standard Ohio instructions (no reference to nullification), Maryland
instructions (apprising jurors of their power to decide the law), and specially drafted radical nullification
instructions (urging jurors to appreciate their power to express community sentiment, their own
conscience, and encouraged jurors to exercise, in appropriate cases, their historic power to ignore the
law). The three different instructions produced the same results in a murder case. The radical
nullification instructions produced more acquittals in a euthanasia case and more convictions in a drunk
driving case. The Ohio and Maryland instructions produced similar verdicts in all three cases.
37. Id. at 452.
38. Follow-up research should test whether jurors who receive implicit instructions on the law
during arguments from lawyers are better informed than those who receive only judges' instructions.
Compare Blanck et al., supra note 35 (focusing on the effects of nonverbal communication during
judges' instructions), and Hart, supra note 35 with Horowitz, supra note 36 (using lawyers' arguments).
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advocates, more control over the trial's presentation, which is consistent with
the theory of the adversary system. 9 Since arguments by lawyers are neither
evidence nor instruction, they are not subject to challenge for error and review
on appeal. The trial judge is free to concentrate on presenting law that serves
only the formal requirements of technical accuracy, thereby focusing on
avoiding reversible error.
Allowing lawyers to do the actual instructing and allowing judges to focus
on avoiding formal error serves several important values and goals of the trial
process. First, it reinforces the adversarial nature of our legal system by
increasing party control and judicial passivity. Second, it increases the
efficiency of trials by dividing the task of instruction in such a way that the
lawyers can educate jurors without risk of reversal and judges can concentrate
on making technically correct pronouncements to the institution of law and the
larger community.
If this reading of the process is correct, we might expect in the future to see
judicial instruction improve in clarity and strengthen in effect as judges wrest
increased control from lawyers as the trend toward more active judicial
management of trials continues.40
C. Historical Inertia
By "historical inertia" I mean something more important than "this is how
we've always done it." As we all know, common-law judges developed a
variety of devices to soften the impact of harsh English law. A recent
suggestion has been made that incomprehensible jury instructions may have
been one of those devices.4 If jurors didn't know exactly what the Bloody
Code defined to be crimes, for example, judicial nullification of the law
would liberate the jurors to exercise their own intuitions to do justice in the
case before them. These same judicial instincts may continue in modem jury
instructions. Unjust laws or unjust applications can be blunted. If the facts are
clear and the law is just,42 then it may not matter whether the instructions
are given clearly or not, because the jury is likely to come to the same
conclusion with or without the instructions.
39. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 22-
27 (1975).
40. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982).
41. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, in
THE FUTURE OF THE CIVIL JURY (R. Litan and M. Whitehead eds., 1993).
42. Especially as seen from the viewpoint of public opinion.
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D. Clear General Principles and Unfettered Tailoring
Elsewhere I have discussed the theory that the trial system needs to operate
within a certain range of clarity and ambiguity without foundering on the
rocks of too much uncertainty or too much clarity.43 I referred to this as
providing a picture of trial outcomes that is shaded an "optimal gray." If the
law were to become too uncertain, not only would it provide no guidance, but
(to take the extreme situation of becoming totally random) no cases would be
brought to trial. If a trial were nothing more than a coin toss, litigants could
decide to toss that coin more cheaply on their own than by submitting cases
for trial. But if no cases came to trial, the judicial process would lack the raw
material out of which the law evolves. 4
At the other extreme, if the law were so clear and trial outcomes so
predictable as to leave no doubt in the minds of attorneys, all cases would
settle and, once again, no cases would come to trial. The courts and, to a
degree, legislatures, would be deprived of their sample of disputes upon which
to build the law. Therefore, the first thing that is accomplished by giving
instructions of limited clarity is to help maintain the necessary optimal gray
of the litigation process.
But that is not all that is accomplished. The audience for jury instructions
may not be juries at all. The real audience may be the legal community.
Instructions that make sense to lawyers and judges-especially when they are
ritualistically repeated at trials and in appellate opinions-help to reinforce
among the legal community the law's doctrinal principles. It is those general
doctrines on which lawyers advise clients and that guide the negotiated
settlement of disputes. But those general principles have less application to
the relatively tiny proportion of cases that actually come to trial. Something
(probably a variety of things) distinguishes cases that come to trial from cases
that settle. Those differences are responsible for their failure to settle, in spite
of considerable incentives for lawyers and clients to want to settle. Many of
the tried cases' unique features are likely to be the factual circumstances of
the dispute.
43. Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, 51 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 243 (1988). In that article, I offered evidence showing that jury verdicts are far more predictable
than is assumed, and that they can be made even more so, but that judges seem to make choices
calculated to prevent growth in predictability and sometimes to reduce the predictability. Additional
evidence is provided in Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
44. In modem times, this is less critical, of course. But the change is more a matter of degree than
of kind. Even legislated law still evolves through judicial interpretation.
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A poor fit between a dispute's facts and the applicable law means that
either the jury will have to perform a procrustean feat in order to fit the law
to the facts, or the courts will have to modify the law repeatedly in order to
deal in principled ways with a stream of sui generis cases. The first of these
options would entail giving jurors clear but ill-fitting law. That would be a
terrible solution because it would do little to help the jury solve the problem
before it and would highlight areas where the law lacks normative relevance
to disputes. This option is no better, and perhaps worse, than giving juries
incomprehensible instructions. The second option would entail a deepening
complexification of the law in order to adapt it to infrequent situations. The
latter option would be highly inefficient.4" Also, the more parsed and precise
the law is, the more complex it becomes, and the more incomprehensible to
judges and lawyers. In short, the principled alternatives to judicial nullifica-
tion would be to develop far more complicated laws to produce the same
decisions "under law" or to rigidly follow the law to verdicts that strike most
judges and jurors as unjust.
Such an arrangement could hardly be improved upon, and is an example of
the law's hidden genius. The institution of the jury permits the law to have
it both ways. By instructing juries in the law, and insisting that they are duty-
bound to follow that law, we reinforce the consistency and uniformity of the
abstract law. By instructing juries in a way that makes it impossible for them
to understand what the law is, we increase the likelihood that they will do
particularized justice in the concrete case before them.46 The ninety-five
percent or more of cases that are dismissed or settled will be decided in light
of the abstract law.47 The five percent or fewer that are decided at trial will
receive individualized justice. In this way, the law is able at once to provide
both uniformity and flexibility-a profound achievement.
In sum, by giving incomprehensible instructions, the law accomplishes
several important goals: reinforcing general doctrine, keeping law from
becoming intolerably complex, helping to maintain the fiction of essential
unpredictability, and tailoring decisions in sui generis cases to the unique
circumstances of those cases.
45. Though it reflects the growth of the common law writ small (or, perhaps, writ detailed). But
at some point we have to decide that the ever-deepening detail of rules has to stop.
46. Instructions forbidding bias will still be heard and understood-or should be made to be heard
and understood-so that the goal of decision making based on characteristics of the dispute and not on
the disputants, is not weakened.
47. Abstract law will also be used to advise clients.
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CONCLUSION
That jury instructions are largely incomprehensible has been evident for
quite some time. Linguistic and psychological research seems to confirm what
was intuitively obvious to many judges and lawyers-and certainly to
members of the public comprising juries. Whether the law is nullified by
juries or by judges, the effect is much the same: cases are loosened from the
moorings that might be supplied by the substantive law.
That such judicial nullification (or its equivalent, carried out by juries)
usually has no great ill effects is evidenced by the fact that most judges agree
most of the time with the jury's verdict.4 8 Thus, it would appear that the
intuitions of a group of lay jurors regarding justice generally correspond to
the policies of the law, or at least of trial judges.49 From this it follows that
calls for explicit instruction to jurors on their power to nullify are superflu-
ous, while judicial fears of anarchy at the hands of jurors if they were thus
advised are extravagant.
I have advanced a number of possible explanations for judicial nullification,
each seeking to identify the utility that might inhere in a practice that would
seem so destructive to the law, yet which remains so widespread and resistant
to change. Not only do each of these explanations suggest a potential value
to a seemingly counter-productive practice, each puts a surprisingly tidy
wrapper around the litigation process, which probably can never be anything
other than messy and difficult. An additional function of such packaging is
that by concealing the disarray within it, it permits people to work their way
through their arduous decisions and emerge feeling reasonably good about the
process and therefore about the decision.
A final implication of this analysis is that we ought not to clarify jury
instructions too hastily on the assumption that clearer must be better. In doing
that, we might unwittingly damage important functions and delicate balances,
and make certain institutional goals more difficult to achieve. Where improved
instructions are introduced, their effects ought to be evaluated with reference
to the sorts of functions that have been discussed in this Article. If we were
to evaluate only the improved comprehension of instructions, we might miss
the harm clarification might do.
48. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3 (showing high level of concordance between judges' and
juries' verdicts, and that judges attribute most of the discordance to factors other than jury disagreement
with the law).
49. Where the law and the equities are poles apart, lawyers would be well-advised to take their case
before a judge rather than a jury. They need not be advised, however, because this is already what they
do.
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